The biggest democratic failure of 20th century

The World War I was over. German Revolution was declared a success and Weimar republic was proclaimed. But the suffering from the Great Depression and unfavorable conditions of Treaty of Versailles couldn’t not help but widen the gap of declared system of parliamentary democracy and the harsh political and economic reality of the country. Important factor exacerbating the situation was a right-wing myth that Germany lost the war because of the German Revolution. Radical left-wing communists, on the other hand, were playing with popular emotions by trying to combat what they saw as capitalist policies. To quench the political instability, a rather controversial figure was appointed as Chancellor of Germany on 30 January, 1933.

His rise was difficult and littered with obstacles. It started when the German government received reports of an imminent terrorist attack. A terrorist had launched feeble attacks on a few famous buildings, but the media largely ignored his relatively small efforts. At the time the man who claimed to be the nation’s leader had not been elected by a majority vote and many claimed he had no right to the powers he coveted. Six years later, this leader did not only command popularity and patriotic feelings of his nation but was also hailed as the “Man of the Year” by Times magazine.

He was a simpleton and had a coarse use of language. His simplistic and inflammatory nationalistic rhetoric offended foreign leaders and the well-educated elite. And, as a young man, he’d joined a secret society with an occult-sounding name. The only visible talent he possessed was drawing.

“You are now witnessing the beginning of a great epoch in history,” he proclaimed, standing in front of the burned building, surrounded by national media. He used the occasion to declare an all-out war on terrorism, originating, according to him, in the Middle East and in their religions.

Four weeks later, the nation’s now-popular leader had pushed through legislation – in the name of combating terrorism – that suspended constitutional guarantees of free speech, privacy, and habeas corpus. Police could now intercept mail and wiretap phones; suspected terrorists could be imprisoned without specific charges; police could sneak into people’s homes without warrants if the cases involved terrorism. To get his patriotic “Decree on the Protection of People and State” passed over the many objections of concerned legislators, he agreed to put a four-year provision on it. Citizens who protested the leader in public – and there were many – quickly found themselves confronting the newly empowered police, jail cells.

He wanted to stir a “racial pride” (based on eugenics of Gobineau) among his countrymen and began referring to the nation by “Heimat” (Homeland). Playing on this implicitly racial nationalism, he argued that any international body that didn’t act first and foremost in the best interest of his nation was neither relevant nor useful. He withdrew his country from the League Of Nations in 1933, and in 1935 negotiated a naval armaments agreement with England. To further consolidate his power, he reached out to industry, bringing former executives of the nation’s largest corporations into high government positions.

His propaganda minister orchestrated a campaign to ensure the people that he was a deeply religious Christian. Every then German soldier was sporting a belt buckle with “Gott Mit Uns” (God Is With Us). Along the same lines, he declared that the nation had clear Christian roots, that any nation that didn’t openly support religion was morally bankrupt. Many government functions started with prayer.

His speech on April 12, 1922 included:

“My feeling as a Christian points me to my Lord and Savior as a fighter. It points me to the man who once in loneliness, surrounded only by a few followers … was greatest not as a sufferer but as a fighter.

“As a Christian … I have the duty to be a fighter for truth and justice…”

But after an interval of peace following the terrorist attack, voices of dissent again arose within and without the government. Students (later regrouped as White Rose) had started an active program opposing him and leaders of neighboring nations were speaking out against his racially discriminatove rhetoric. His propaganda minister ntensified the nationalistic campaign. Those questioning him were labeled “anti-German” or “not good Germans.” Another technique was to “manufacture news,” through the use of paid shills posing as reporters, seducing real reporters with promises of access to the leader in exchange for favorable coverage, and veiled threats to those who exposed his lies.

In 1939, to “attenuate” the economic decline and re-unify the nation, he pointed at an external threat: Czechoslovakia (despite English warnings). Shortly after, Poland was invaded in a “defensive, pre-emptive” action.

As his propaganda minister said:

“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.”

This dictum not only became reality in Germany but also with it, the leader’s popularity grew as the nation plunged into yet another world war.

The leader of the nation was Adolf Hitler who put an end to the first democratic experiment in Germany.

Failed states in 2008

The Fund for Peace is an independent nonprofit research and educational organization founded in 1957 by investment banker Randolph Compton. Since its inception, it aimed at prevention of conflicts and alleviation of causes of conflicts. Due to its historic role and analysis conducted in socio-economic, political and demographic fields, the Fund came up with the idea of evaluating countries based on indicators such as demographic pressures, economic development, and deterioration of environment, among others. From 2005 co-operating with Foreign Policy magazine, the Fund publishes its annual “Failed States Index” that provides results of analysing a large set of factors causing/contributing for a state to fail or become weak. While generally a good starting point of information for decision-makers, few criticize the notion of “a failed state” because its frequent references to countries considered a threat to the US government.

The index provides assessment only for sovereign states (determined by membership in the United Nations). Territories such as Taiwan, the Palestinian Territories, and Northern Cyprus are not figuring on the list until their political status and UN membership is ratified. Ranking is measured based on 12 indicators, which are divided into three categories: social, economic and political. For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest (most stable) and 10 being the highest (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0 (least failed) to 120 (most failed).

Social Indicators

I-1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
I-2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies
I-3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
I-4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators
I-5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
I-6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

Political Indicators
I-7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
I-8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
I-9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights
I-10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”
I-11. Rise of Factionalized Elites

I-12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

In the words of the people from Foreign Policy:

Because it is crucial to closely monitor weak states—their progress, their deterioration, and their ability to withstand challenges—the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and FOREIGN POLICY present the fourth annual Failed States Index. Using 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators, we ranked 177 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration. To do so, we examined more than 30,000 publicly available sources, collected from May to December 2007, to form the basis of the index’s scores. The 60 most vulnerable states are listed in the rankings, and the full results are available at ForeignPolicy.com and fundforpeace.org.

According to this year’s Index, Somalia is the number one failed state in the world while Norway is the most prosperous. Moreover, seven out of the ten most failed states in the world are from Africa (only exception being Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq). There are currently 35 failed states (marked in red) of which 19 are African.

The report claims Somalia is the most failed state in the world. Many researchers believe that Somalia is a collapsed state since the collapse of its national government in 1991. Somalia scored a record amount of points this year: 114.2 (out of maximum possible 120), which is also the closest a state got to complete failure since the Failed States Index was first published. The country report shows that none of Somalia’s indicators improved since the last year’s index.

Due to ongoing crisis in financial markets, Iceland (172nd on the 2008 list), considered one of the least failed or best countries in the world (the best country to live according to the UN Development Index 2007) turned in a matter of few weeks (mainly due to its almost exclusive economic reliance on the global financial markets) into a state on the verge of national bankruptcy.

Iceland is a glaring example of how “well” globalization works its magic in the modern era of interconnectedness and interdependence.

Bismarck’s struggle for unification

In the history of Germany no one man has single-handedly accomplished more for his country than Otto von Bismarck who, among his other achievements, orchestrated the foundation of the German Empire in 1871. As Prussian prime minister and German chancellor, he was determined to unite all of Prussia. In this struggle, he sought to make Germany the greatest power in Europe, but realized that to achieve this goal, national (cultural, religious, political) unity was essential. He identified the main obstacle to German unification the extensive presence of Catholicism in the southern Germany. Thus, he undertook measures dealing with threats of division.

Kulturkampf (as this “struggle for unification” came to be known) was a struggle between Bismarck and Catholics beginning as early as 1864 when Pope Pius IX issued the Syllabus Errorum. The pope in this papal statement condemned the practices of modern actions such as civil marriage and civil education. This was the response of the Church to the Industrial Revolution and modernization sweeping aside their conservative, tradition-bound views of life. Liberal feelings were more exacerbated when the First Vatican Council in 1870 adopted the doctrine of papal infallibility (on issues of faith and morality). There were fears the pope will declare himself infallible on all matters and try to establish a new Holy Roman Empire.

These two proclamations angered Bismarck, but his hands were tied with the war (Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71). His first aim was to unify Protestants and Catholics under one State. But even though he included the Protestants, the concern was the rising Catholic vote. The war brought Catholic Alsace and Lorraine into German hands, resulting in a large (30%) Catholic representation in the new Empire. These Catholics established the Catholic Centre Party to reassure themselves of the support of the Church. In a short period, it became the second strongest political party in Germany. Bismarck used these inconveniences of the political rivalry with the Centre Party and authorized his anti-papal campaign. “He objected to the existence of a confessional party because it seemed to stand for allegiance to an authority other than the national state.” Bismarck simply “could not conceive that a faithful child of the Church could also be a loyal son of the fatherland.” Bismarck himself was a very religious man who sought out the guidance of God in his administration of state affairs.

The National Liberal Party was what Bismarck needed to campaign against the Pope and the Catholic Centre Party. They too saw the doctrine of papal infallibility as unacceptable. Thus without any hesitation, they carried out the plan of Kulturkampf and made it their campaign platform, being encouraged by Bismarck.

With the abolishment of the Catholic department of the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship and Education and the appointment of Adalbert Falk to the position of Prussian Ministry of Public Worship, Bismarck was ready to disperse his anti-Catholic measures throughout Germany. Falk was an anti-clerical rationalist who desired to please Bismarck and managed to bring the Liberals closer to Bismarck. Falk began by trying to get the school inspection provisions made into law, passing the School Inspection Law in 1872. The law required that a special school inspectorate be established, which would allow the Prussian authorities mandatory power to inspect all schools instead of the Church. Falk then brought a law directly against the liberals traditional enemy, the Jesuits. This was a blow towards the education of Germany, since from the Counter Reformation, the Jesuits had established themselves firmly in education. Furthermore, in 1873, he passed the May Laws intended to remove all the priests from state service, legalize civil marriage and education, and make the inclusion of political propaganda in sermons illegal. As a result of the May Laws, two archbishops were imprisoned and 1300 parishes found themselves without priests. German people were becoming more and more alienated and while many German Catholics resented the pope’s assumption of infallibility, they resented even more what Bismarck and the National Liberals did. Instead of going to Bismarck’s side, they rallied behind the Church. The Centre Party increased, and persecution and imprisonment only strengthened their numbers to 94 seats by 1874 (from 58 in 1871).

The outcry of the Kulturkampf finally came on July 13, 1874, as Bismarck rode by in his carriage in Bad Kissingen. A Catholic cooper Eduard Kullmann attempted to assassinate him (managed only to wound his right hand). Bismarck charged the Catholic Centre Party for inspiring the would-be assassin. But the desired affect was not achieved. The hatred and failure of the Kulturkampf was still felt over the nation.

In 1879, Bismarck finally reversed his domestic policies and scrapped the Kulturkampf. He repealed most of the May Laws and allowed the religious orders to return and for the Roman Catholic Church to recover control of its seminaries. He made Falk appear the mastermind of the entire Kulturkampf (claiming he did not have the time to read the May Laws that Falk had published). Knowing that he needed the support of the majority in order to pass his new economic reforms, he abandoned Liberals and began to negotiate with the Centre Party. His recovery allowed him to adopt a new interest: the welfare of German industries and reforms to the government’s policies of free trade. In the process of erasing the failure of Kulturkampf from the minds of the people, Bismarck introduced protectionist tariffs, which alienated the National Liberals who supported free trade but brought a much-sought support of embattled German industrialists in addition to working and middle classes, which was what eventually united Germany.

Bismarck had indeed made Germany into a world power and proved himself once more to be a remarkable statesman even in the aftermath of Kulturkampf.

Source: Heather Statton

China: change of policy in 15th century

The Greek name for the Chinese was Seres, from which the Latin word serica derives, meaning silk.

China has always viewed itself as being at the centre of its world, traditionally. The modern word for the country, Zhong guo (Central Realm), seems to say it all.

Writing materials such as rolls of silk came from the 2nd century BC, and paper from the 2nd century AD (Cai Lun, 105AD). Printing too was a Chinese invention: fixed blocks were cut to print whole pages (Feng Dao, 932AD), and movable type was introduced from the 11th century AD (Bi Sheng, 1041AD). China was the first to establish the enduring institution of public service examination (founded under Sui Dynasty, 605, till its abolition in 1905).

Additionally, Chinese advances in iron and steel manufacture were several hundred years ahead of Europe. Coal was being mined from 8th century and used in furnaces producing high quality iron and steel. Chinese are also credited for inventions of saddle and stirrup (5th century), compass (possibly 20-100AD), gunpowder (Taoist monks in search of “elixir for immortality,” 9th century) and porcelain (under Tang Dynasty, 7th century).

Maritime inventions credited to Chinese also include the anchor, the drop-keel, the capstan, canvas and pivoting sails.

By medieval times, China became the most intellectually sophisticated and technologically advanced country in the world.

Then came the year 1405 under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). Fleets of hundreds of immense Chinese ships (28,000 people sailing on 300 ships. It was a fleet whose size and grandeur would not be matched until World War I) headed by admiral Zheng He traversed from the China Sea past Sumatra to Ceylon, India, Arabia and East Africa. Seven epic Chinese naval expeditions from 1405 to 1433 explored and brought under the Chinese tributary system the vast periphery of the Indian Ocean. However, less than a century after this Chinese maritime high water mark, it was a crime to even go to sea from China in a multi-masted ship.

The economic motive for these huge ventures may have been important, and many of the ships had large private cabins for merchants. But the chief aim was probably political, to enroll further states as tributaries and mark the reemergence of the Chinese Empire following nearly a century of barbarian rule. The political character of Zheng He’s voyages indicates the primacy of the political elites. Despite their formidable and unprecedented strength, Zheng He’s voyages, unlike European voyages of exploration later in the fifteenth century, were not intended to extend Chinese sovereignty overseas. The question therefore begs how could such a policy (containing enormous potential for growth and prosperity), started in 1405, come to an abrupt halt and reversal by 1433.

There is no definite answer to that question. However, few possible explanations were postulated.

Political power struggle between two factions of the Chinese Imperial court (between the Confucian courtiers and the palace eunuchs), combined with an overwhelming demand for political centralization and unity.
There was an Imperial decree to decommission decision the great navy over the whole of China, reasoning behind such a decision possibly that renovation turned into stagnation, and that science and philosophy were caught in a tight net of traditions smothering any attempt to venture something new. This decision became irreversible due to the loss of shipyards capable of turning out ships that would prove the folly of that temporary decision.
There was an internal Chinese court policy struggle between competing theories of the commercial and technology benefits of foreign trade, against the benefits in social purity of isolationism. Isolationism won.
The navy had become dependent in the 15th century on a meager set of maritime missions that were overly fragile and thus the Chinese navy was vulnerable to relatively minor changes in the strategic situation. The completion of the Grand Canal as a more efficient and safer means of grain transport became an important factor, which engendered the demise of the Chinese ocean-going navy.
Maritime threats (piracy) were always considered secondary in China to continental or land-based threats, and thus in difficult economic and political times (threat to revival of Mongol power on the northern steppe) during the Ming period, the maritime solutions to national security (navy) lost resources to the continental solutions (army).

Perhaps several factors separately or their combination caused a Chinese rejection of sea trade and seapower in the mid-15th century. We can never know for certain.

What we do know is that traditional ethnocentric and culturally well-cultivated Chinese were ever so anticipative. It is no secret that a following maxim has been a byword of not only Chinese warfare but also other strategic maneuvers throughout the ages.

“Steal the beams, change the pillars” (from “36 Strategems”).

China is on rise again. Let us see how far it will go this time.

Crassus tries to take on Parthians

At the beginning of 54 BC, Marcus Licinius Crassus had just finished serving his joint-consul year with Pompey. Crassus was a greedy man and felt a great desire to achieve new glory and get even richer. He had seen no action since his defeat of Spartacus nearly 20 years earlier.

He turned to Parthia. Parthia was led by the Arsacid dynasty, which reunited and ruled over the Iranian plateau, after defeating the Seleucids, beginning in the late 3rd century BC and was the latest archenemy of the Roman Empire in the east. Parthia was the hereditary of the ancient Persian civilization and its wealth.

In 53 BC, Artavasdes, the Armenian king and vassal of Crassus, advised him to take a route through Armenia avoiding the desert, but Crassus refused. Parthian army – half of it while the other half was sent against Armenians – that met Crassus was commanded by Surena and consisted entirely of cavalry units, to scout out, delay, and, if possible, destroy Crassus. The two armies clashed near the town of Carrhae. Though demoralised by the hot climate and long route, Crassus’ troops heavily outnumbered the Parthians. The Parthian armies included two types of cavalry, heavily-armed and armoured cataphracts and lightly armed but highly-mobile mounted archers. For the Romans, who relied on heavy infantry, the Parthians were difficult to defeat, as both types of cavalry were much faster and more mobile than foot soldiers.

Furthermore, the Parthians used strategies during warfare unfamiliar to the Romans, such as the famous “Parthian shot“, firing arrows backwards at the gallop. Crassus having never encountered such an army or strategic warfare before was defeated decisively at the Battle of Carrhae. This was the beginning of a series of wars that were to last for almost three centuries.

After the defeat, Crassus was fed molten gold, a symbolic gesture for his greed. On the other hand, the Parthians found it difficult to conquer Roman eastern provinces completely.

While the Roman legions returned a few years later and stemmed the Parthians at the gates of Antioch (Syria), the folly of Crassus and the defeat at Carrhae of Roman’s renowned legions still lives in memory.

Attempt to market America

In the wake of 9/11 and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, image of America became a rallying call of action for all anti-American elements abroad. When the White House finally decided it was time to address the rising tides of anti-Americanism around the world, it didn’t look for a seasoned diplomat. Instead, in keeping with the Bush administration’s neoconservative philosophy favoring private over public sector (Dick Cheney and Colin Powell being the other two neocons in the Bush Administration), it hired one of the then top brand managers in America.

From October 2001, as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Charlotte Beers‘ assignment was not to improve relations with other countries but rather to perform an overhaul of the American image abroad. A recipient of prestigious “Legend in Leadership Award” from the Chief Executive Leadership Institute of the Yale School of Management, Beers had no previous diplomatic experience but had held the top job at both the J. Walter Thompson and Ogilvy & Mather ad agencies.

The appointment of an inexperienced (in diplomacy and state politics) person to this post understandably raised some criticism, but the then Secretary of State Colin Powell shrugged it off. “There is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something. We are selling a product. We need someone who can rebrand American foreign policy, rebrand diplomacy.” “The whole idea of building a brand is to create a relationship between the product and its user,” she explained. “We’re going to have to communicate the intangible assets of the United States — things like our belief system and our values.”

From her point of view the tattered international image of America was little more than a communication problem. In fact, the problem was just the opposite: America’s marketing of itself has been too effective. School children could recite its claims to democracy, liberty and equal opportunity as readily as they could associate Nike with athletic prowess. And they expected the US to live up to its claims. And here lied the real problem. Results of economic and political decisions coming from Washington didn’t seem to correspond to the message and promises so staunchly promoted by American politicians. It was like a false ad, where promised qualities and real qualities of a product are different. America’s problem was not with its brand— which could scarcely be stronger — but with its product.

In the corporate world, once a “brand identity” is settled upon by the head office, it is enforced with military precision throughout a company’s operations. The brand identity may be tailored to accommodate local language and cultural preferences, but its core features — vision, aesthetic, message — remain unchanged. At its core, branding is about rigorously controlled one-way messages prevented to being turned into a social dialogue.

America already demands too much “consistency and discipline” from other nations; that beneath its stated commitment to democracy and sovereignty, it is deeply intolerant of deviations from the economic model known as the “the Washington Consensus.” Whether these policies, so beneficial to foreign investors, are enforced by the Washington-based IMF or through international trade agreements, critics generally feel that the world is already too influenced by America’s brand of governance and American brands.

There is another reason to be wary of mixing the logic of branding with the practice of governance. When companies try to implement global image consistency, they look like generic franchises. When governments do the same, they look authoritarian. It’s no coincidence that political leaders most preoccupied with branding themselves and their parties were also allergic to democracy and diversity. Think Mao and Hitler. Historically, this has been the ugly flip side of politicians striving for consistency of brand: censored information, state controlled media, reeducation camps, purging of dissidents, etc.

Democracy can be described as a confluence of different ideas. It is characterized by diversity of means, approaches and ends. The task was not only futile but dangerous: brand consistency and true human diversity are antithetical, one seeks sameness, the other celebrates difference, one fears all unscripted messages, the other embraces debate and dissent.

Little less than two years into her job, Beers stepped down. Indeed, if anything, prospects of improvement looked as gloomy as ever for this was when Blair and Bush were putting final touches for their next target — Iraq.